The 
Introduction
As the 2006 midterm elections approached, pollsters, scholars, and journalists attempted to predict whether the Democrats would take back the House or Senate, or both. Much media attention was paid to President Bush's declining popularity and the public's dissatisfaction with the Republicancontrolled Congress (for example, see Cook 2006) . With most attention paid to the immediate political dynamics of the campaign, less noticed (though not entirely neglected) was the fact that the Democrats faced a significant structural disadvantage in their effort to retake both houses of Congress. The Democrats faced an uphill battle to control the Senate simply due to the small number of seats that were seriously contested. Their hurdle to taking over the House was subtler but perhaps just as high: as we show here, they needed to win well over half the vote share in order to have an even chance of winning 50% of the seats, thereby overcoming a structural advantage enjoyed by Republicans leading up to Election Day.
The Democrats were seeking to end 12 years of Republican control of the House. As Erikson (2006) notes, control of Congress is not simply a function of the preferences of the electorate; factors such as geography, incumbency advantage, and partisan bias in the seats-votes curve influence which party controls Congress, and for how long. The Democrats in 2006 had to overcome both a built-in incumbency advantage for the Republicans and a significant partisan bias that had emerged in favor of the Republicans following their takeover of the House in 1994. In fact, in four of the five elections between 1996 and 2004, Democratic candidates won more votes on average than their Republican opponents, yet were unable to retake the House. 1 This bias is consistent with the well-known tendency that the party in power tends to win a greater share of seats than votes (Tufte 1973) . 
Predicting House Elections Nationally or by Districts
Forecasts of congressional elections typically focus on the production of a point prediction: the party out of power will pick up x seats, meaning they either will or will not control the House or Erikson and Sigelman 1995, inter alia) . And to be sure, macro-level predictions have their advantages. The point predictions that result from them are intuitive and lead to a dichotomous answer-which party will control the House-that is of interest to scholars, politicians, the media, and the public alike. It is also much easier to collect data at a single level of analysis per election, allowing one to ignore idiosyncrasies at the district level.
The district level, however, incorporates a wealth of information that macro-level predictions throw away by definition. Variables such as the predisposition of voters for one party or the other, incumbency, and whether a race is uncontested play crucial elements in determining the vote division in each race. This, in turn, determines who wins each race, which in turn affects the ultimate seat division. Thus, predicting the vote at the district level is true to the actual process by which 2 The point predictions among these forecasts ranged from a low of Democrats winning 216 seats (Campbell 2006 ) to a high of them winning 235 seats (Bafumi, Erikson and Wlezien 2006) . The latter, which is similar to our approach in that the authors estimate a seats-vote curve based on the generic congressional ballot, came closest to the actual mark of 233.
3 Two exceptions are Bafumi, Erikson and Wlezien (2006) and Klarner and Buchanan (2006) , who incorporate both district-level and national-level information. seats are aggregated. It is also the only way to estimate a seats-votes curve for a single election. We employ this estimate to study the level of partisan bias that favored the Republicans in 2006 and how the Democrats overcame that bias.
Predicting the Seats-Votes Curve for a Single Election
We draw our prediction of the seats-votes curve in 2006 from a statistical model based on the framework for evaluating legislative elections advanced in Gelman and King (1994) . The strength of this approach lies in its ability to forecast elections under a range of possible conditions through the use of simulation analysis that incorporates both a range of possible national swings and the predictive uncertainty inherent in any forecast. This incorporation of uncertainty allows us to make probabilistic predictions about the Democrats' chances of retaking the House. Finally, the approach is also quite parsimonious, employing as predictors only the vote in the prior election in each district, whether the incumbent is running for reelection and whether the race is contested or not.
Simulating Election Outcomes Under a Range of Hypothesized National Swings
Our method can be summarized informally as follows. (A formal description, along with details about variable coding, appears below.) We begin with the consideration that there is a range of possible national swings in the average district vote from one election year to the next. A swing in the direction of the Democratic party will help the Democrats pick up more seats; more specifically, every possible swing will have different implications in more closely contested elections and will lead to a different translation of seats for the Democrats. Our general strategy is to allow the swing to vary across a range of values, and then predict the outcome of every district at each interval in the range. Aggregating these results produces an estimated seats-votes curve.
The partisan swing, however, is unlikely to affect each district in the same manner. We account for district-level heterogeneity by incorporating incumbency and the district-level vote from the previous election, which serves as a proxy for the district's overall predisposition to support the Democratic candidate. 4 Within each interval of the possible national swing, we first use the results of the previous House election to estimate each district's baseline support for the Democratic candidate. We do so by reducing the observed vote total in each district in which an incumbent ran in the previous election by the estimated advantage of incumbency; this measure can be thought of as the "normal vote" for the previous election. We then shrink the normal vote toward 50% to represent that some of this vote arises from election-specific events, and we are interested in the part that continues on to the next election. The next step is to add back in the estimated incumbency advantage to the normal vote for incumbent candidates in the current election. This procedure results in a hypothetical proportion of the Democratic share of the two-party vote in each district.
To account for uncertainty in the prediction, we simulate the outcome in each district 1,000 times, adding independent normally-distributed errors whose standard deviation is based on the residual error from historical House election forecasts. Finally, for each simulation, we shift the entire election result (that is, add or subtract a constant from all the districts) so that the average district vote matches up to that of the previous election. The result is 1,000 hypothetical election outcomes, each corresponding to a zero national swing (but various district-by-district differences).
The next task is to add the national swing to each set of district-level results. We do so in the form of adding a constant to the predicted value within each simulation; we set the constant to a value that ensures that the range of national swings is centered around the average district vote from the previous election.
For every interval in the national swing (in the entire range of average district vote), we thus have 1000 predicted outcomes in each congressional district. We summarize each simulation in two ways. First, we compute the average district vote; second, we compute the proportion of House seats won by the Democrats. Taking the mean seat proportion over all the simulations yields an expected seat share for the Democrats. 5 We then simply "connect the dots" of Democratic share in each interval, producing a predicted seats-votes curve. Formally, we model the vote in each district as follows:
after a district became uncontested. The average of these values was about 0.75 for the incumbent party and represents the average "effective support" for the party in uncontested races. For a measure based on the presidential vote in congressional districts, see Erikson (2006) . For every value of δ t , we simulate our model 1000 times. For each simulation, we record the share of seats predicted to be won by Democratic candidates (that is,
where n equals the number of districts in a given election year. 9 We then take the average seat share measure to produce an expected seat proportion for the Democrats at the given value of δ t . We repeat this procedure over a range of values of δ t , allowing for a predicted translation between votes and seats at a plausible range of national swings.
Validating by Fitting to Previous Elections
To demonstrate the validity of our method, we applied it to the 19 non-redistricting election years , along with incumbency and party indicators, for each nonredistricting election year (i.e., those not ending in "2") from 1946-2004. For each election year analyzed, we take the average of the coefficient on the lagged vote from the previous five years. The estimates of ρ have a mean of 0.68 with a standard deviation of 0.11. 8 We set σ to 0.066, which is the mean of the residual standard deviations from the yearly regressions discussed in the previous footnote.
9 In 1958 and 1960, respectively, 436 and 437 seats were contested due to the addition of Alaska and Hawaii as states. We also dropped the handful of races featuring third-party candidates (with the exception of Bernard Sanders-an independent who held Vermont's congressional seat from 1998-2004 and who organized with the Democratic partywhom we classified as a Democrat). 
Figure 2: Seats-votes curve prediction and actual election results, 1958-2004 (excluding redistricting years). For each year, the line depicts the estimated seats-votes curve, and the dot shows the actual election result. The light gray lines are references for 50% of the vote and 50% of the seats. As is well known (King and Gelman 1991), seats-votes curves have become less steep in recent decades-a given swing in votes will typically result in a lower swing in seats than before. As the plots show, the actual election result typically conforms closely to the predicted seats-votes curve.
off by 26 and 19 seats, respectively, in those years. For 10 of the elections, the prediction error was less than 4 seats. The root mean squared error of the predictive standard deviation of seats given votes is 0.01, or about 4 seats, implying that the rest of the predictive error is due to year-to-year variation unexplained by the model. Thus, the model is not perfect, but we believe it demonstrates ample validity to serve as a useful tool for studying the relationship between seats and votes in the 2006 elections. 
Average District Vote and Total Vote
In this paper we have summarized election results using the average district vote-that is, the parties' share of the two-party vote, averaged over the 435 congressional districts: for the Democrats, this is 1 n n i=1 v i . This is the usual way that political scientists aggregate Congressional vote Gelman 1991, Gelman and King 1994) and is a reasonable summary in that it is relatively immune to turnout variation and represents the national level of support for the party.
An alternative measure is the share of total vote that goes to the Democrats, which can be written as As noted above, we prefer average district vote as a summary measure of national support for the parties, and so that is what we have used in this paper.
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Using this method, we predicted prior to the election the seats-votes curve for 2006, along with estimated probabilities of the Democrats taking control of the House given their average district vote. 10 Figure 4a presents the estimated seats-votes curve, along with the actual average district vote and the percentage of seats the Democrats won. 11 Figure 4b depicts the predicted probability of the Democrats winning the House given their average district vote. 12 The points respectively show the actual average district vote and seat share for the Democrats, and the predicted probability that the Democrats would win the House, based on the actual average district vote. As the seatsvotes curve demonstrates, our prediction was very close to the mark. The Democrats earned 54.8%
of the average district vote, an amount that we predicted would lead to them gaining 53.1% of the seats, or 231 seats. In actuality, they won 233 seats. We estimated that the Democrats had a 92% probability of winning the House based on their average district vote.
Our model confirms that the Democrats faced a stacked electoral deck heading into the 2006 elections. They needed 52% of the average district vote just to have a 50% probability of winning the House, and needed nearly 55% (which they obtained) to ensure control. To borrow Krugman's (2006) metaphor, the Democrats needed a "storm surge" to overcome the "high Republican levee" erected by the Republicans' structural advantages.
The source of the bias could be found largely in the difference between districts controlled by the two parties: some of this difference was due to geographic factors and favorable redistricting, and some to the Republicans' incumbency advantage. 11 Vote totals for the Democratic and Republican candidates are based on official certified results from each state. As noted earlier, for each uncontested race, we imputed the vote to 0.25 for districts where no Democratic candidate ran and 0.75 for districts where no Republican candidate ran. Three districts warrant explanation. In Louisiana's 2nd district, where incumbent William Jefferson (D) won in a runoff election held in December, we used the results of the original election to measure the Democrats' vote in the district because the runoff only featured Democratic candidates. In Texas' 23rd district, incumbent Henry Bonilla (R) was defeated in a December runoff. Here we used the results from the runoff election since it was contested by both parties. Finally, we used the official certified results from the election in Florida's 13th district, which was marred by apparent voter machine malfunctions. 12 We generated predicted probabilities by taking the deterministic seats prediction (the expected value from a probabilistic district-by-district prediction) at each interval of the national swing and then adding predictive uncertainty based on the root mean squared error of the historical seats votes curves presented in Figure 2 . we can use our model to construct a preliminary estimation of the 2008 seats-votes curve to predict whether the Democrats might still face a partisan bias. Recall that our model depends on knowing which incumbents are running for re-election; because that is unknowable at this point, for each simulation we simply assume every incumbent had a 90% probability of running. 14 We also assume there will be no uncontested races. For consistency, we examine the probability of the Republicans retaking the House in 2008, given their average district vote.
The results are presented in Figure 6 . The results suggest that the Democrats' victory in 2006 did indeed remove the bias that favored the Republicans. Our model estimates that the Democrats will need just 49% of the vote to have a 50% probability of retaining control of the House, meaning the Republicans will need 51% to have an even chance of retaking it. Thus, while the Democrats may enjoy a partisan bias in 2008, it will likely be much less than the Republicans enjoyed in 2006.
In addition, two other countervailing forces will affect the Republicans' chances in 2008. On the one hand, if our model is correct, the 51% of the average district vote they will need to have a 50% probability of retaking the House is larger than any percentage they have received since 1994.
On the other, the Democrats will need to defend the seats of their first-term members who won in
Republican-leaning districts in 2006, and are unlikely to receive as large an average vote share as they did in 2006. For this reason, the Democratic leadership has given these freshman favorable committee assignments in an effort to boost their incumbency advantage (Nagourney 2006) . 13 The bias the Democrats face in the Senate is even more severe due to the Republicans' geographical advantage. As Hacker and Pierson (2006, 12) 
Conclusion
We used a parsimonious model of elections to predict and analyze the translation between votes and seats in the 2006 House elections, and to make a preliminary assessment of the 2008 election.
We validated the model on the previous half-century of House elections, as shown in Figure 2 .
As a methodological matter, it is crucial that we both took a district-level approach and estimated a separate seats-votes curve for each election, rather than combining several election results to estimate a time-averaged curve, as is often done. Our results show that it took a large wave of Democratic support in 2006 to overcome the Republicans' structural advantages, and that the Democrats' newfound incumbency advantage will help them in their efforts to retain control of the House in 2008, while by no means guaranteeing it.
